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Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s 
engagement with African development 
 
 
 
Marcus Power (Durham University) & Giles Mohan (The Open University)1 
 
Abstract: China, in its quest for a closer strategic partnership with Africa, has 
increasingly dynamic economic, political and diplomatic activities on the 
continent. Chinese leaders and strategists believe that China’s historical 
experience and vision of economic development resonates powerfully with 
African counterparts and that the long standing history of friendly political 
linkages and development co-operation offers a durable foundation for future 
partnership. In doing so, we see from the Chinese side and amongst some 
western commentators a form of exceptionalism and generalisation regarding 
both China and Africa. In this paper instead we seek to develop theoretical tools 
for examining China as a geopolitical and geoeconomic actor that is both 
different and similar to other industrial powers intervening in Africa. This is 
premised on a political economy approach that ties together material interests 
with a deconstruction of the discursive or ‘extra-economic’ ways by which 
Chinese capitalism internationalises. From there we use this framework to 
analyse contemporary Chinese engagement in Africa. We examine the changing 
historical position of Africa within Beijing’s foreign policy strategy and China’s 
vision of the evolving international political system, looking in particular at China’s 
bilateral and state-centric approach to working with African ‘partners’. Chinese 
practice is uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the notion of ‘development’ as an 
independent policy field of the kind that emerged among Western nations in the 
course of the 1950s and increasingly China has come to be viewed as a ‘rogue 
creditor’ and a threat to the international aid industry. Rather than highlighting 
one strand of Chinese relations with African states (such as aid or governance) 
we propose here that it is necessary to critically reflect on the wider geopolitics of 
China-Africa relations (past and present) in order to understand how China is 
opening up new ‘choices’ and altering the playing field for African development 
for the first time since the neo-liberal turn of the 1980s.  
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Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s 
engagement with African development 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: China’s ‘soft power’ and ‘rogue aid’ 
 
“China's development, instead of hurting or threatening anyone, can only serve 
peace, stability and common prosperity in the world” (President Hu Jintao, 2005
1
). 
 
China’s growth has required a concerted economic internationalisation and with it 
changing foreign policy discourses, that bring China closer binationally and 
multilaterally to other countries.  As a result the orientation of China’s vision of 
‘development’ both nationally and internationally is shifting. Although still 
premised on long-standing claims of ‘peaceful’ and ‘harmonious’ cooperation  
part of China’s recent internationalisation is the extension of a ‘new’, ‘pragmatic’ 
vision of development.  This ‘new’ vision of interaction around development co-
operation is growth-oriented and market-based leading some observers to 
characterise it as ‘market extremism’2, even a form of neo-liberalism, though one 
with ‘Chinese characteristics’3 in recognition of the traces of Maoism and the 
continuing importance of the state4.  
 
In its pursuit of this growth-oriented strategy, a number of African countries 
(particularly those with significant natural resource endowments) have come to 
occupy centre stage in Chinese foreign policy, as potential sources of raw 
materials to fuel China’s growth. In this way China’s foreign policy is understood 
by some to be shifting from a concern with ‘ideology’ to a preoccupation with 
‘business’, using what Joseph Nye5 terms ‘soft power’ to cajole client states into 
accepting Chinese contracts (Nye himself has served as an advisor to the 
Chinese on how best to utilise this form of power6).  For observers like Chris 
Alden and Ian Taylor7 soft power is part of China’s ‘oil diplomacy’ in which 
notionally unconditional aid, low interest loans and technical co-operation 
agreements8 are used to cement bilateral deals over oil supply, engineering 
contracts, and trade agreements.  As summarised by Tull9:  
 
“Beijing uses the pillars of its foreign policy, notably unconditional respect for 
state sovereignty and its corollary, non-interference, in the pursuit of its 
interests, be they energy security, multipolarity or the “One China” principle. To 
achieve these goals, Beijing is prepared to defend autocratic regimes that 
commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms for narrow ends 
of regime survival”. 
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The rapid resurgence of China in recent years is thus beginning to radically alter 
“the global geopolitical ecology of investment, production, and trade”10. China’s 
greatly expanded scale of operations has generated massive demand for capital, 
goods, raw materials and energy that have pushed up commodity prices with 
important implications for the economies of many African countries. It is the 
effects on governance of China’s overseas aid and investment packages that 
have particularly vexed most commentators in the West. In some policy circles, 
mainly those inhabited by what Nye11 terms the ‘China hawks’, China’s new aid 
offensive has been greeted with scepticism and concern, captured in the idea 
that China is some kind of ‘rogue creditor’ practising opportunistic lending12 and 
proliferating problematic forms of ‘rogue aid’13. One of the biggest criticisms of 
Chinese aid is the lack of political conditionalities, which some argue will lead to 
deepened debt and governance crises in Africa14. Editor-in-Chief of Foreign 
Policy magazine Moisés Naím, for example, represents China as a “threat to 
healthy, sustainable development”15 arguing that the Chinese “are effectively 
pricing responsible and well meaning organizations out of the market in the very 
places they are needed most” whilst “underwriting a world that is more corrupt, 
chaotic and authoritarian”. Many observers and commentators have taken this 
focus on aid and conditionality further to argue that China is potentially a neo-
colonial power16, where African resources are ‘plundered’ by Beijing and sent 
back in the form of Chinese goods thereby cementing the long standing uneven 
division of labour between Africa and the rest of the world.  
 
Despite these negative and possibly justifiable warnings about a ‘new’ 
imperialism China’s emergence as a global development actor raises short-term 
political questions about alternative policy approaches in countries of the global 
South as well as longer-term ideological questions around the very meaning of 
development itself. Many African leaders have heralded the relevance of a 
Chinese ‘model’ of development even though Deng Xiaoping once told an African 
head of state that there was no Chinese model to emulate17.Others see this 
‘model’ as an alternative “to the American model”18 or as “defying the 
conditionalities of the Bretton Woods institutions”19 even though Chinese lending 
does come with its own conditions. Joseph Stiglitz20 even touts China as a 
‘model’ for how developing nations should rise and escape the prescriptions of 
Anglo-American neo-liberalism. Further many commentators have been quick to 
note the ‘lessons’ that Africa can learn from this ‘model’21 and even to suggest 
that China can be Africa’s “economic role model”22. Yet Deng was right, there is 
no single, coherent ‘Chinese model’23. Many observers seem to conflate the 
various possible and often overlapping meanings of this term in problematic and 
contradictory ways. It is thus often used simultaneously to refer to a Chinese 
model of development in China (which serves as an example for others to 
follow), a Chinese development model enacted in Africa to steer the continent’s 
development (in an analogous sense to the Washington Consensus) and as a 
global model of interaction around development cooperation. Thus the singularity 
and coherence of a Chinese ‘model’ has often been considerably overstated, 
despite the internal variation within China (between say rural and urban areas 
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and even between SEZs) and the growing difficulties the Chinese state is facing 
in managing the complex range of corporate agents now active overseas. We 
might also question the supposed ‘Chinese’ nature of this ‘model’ given the 
extent to which China has looked to and drawn from East Asian examples of 
state practice in pursuing ‘development’. China’s government officially denies the 
existence of a ‘Beijing Consensus’ but an official version of the Chinese path to 
development is known as ‘Xiaokang’, the creation of a moderately prosperous 
and harmonious socialist society24. Deng reintroduced the term Xiaokang (which 
was initially used in early Chinese poetry) in 1979 as a goal of Chinese 
modernisation.  
 
In this paper we want to explore the relationships between China’s development, 
its foreign policy and Africa’s political economy and more broadly assess whether 
current theories in IR, political geography and development studies can 
adequately address these evolving relationships.  While we are by no means 
apologists for China we pursue an international political economy perspective 
informed by post-colonial theory which sees China’s interests in Africa as not 
substantially different from those of other industrialised countries vying for the 
continent’s resources, either now or in the past. The tendency to demonise and 
over-determine China’s role by western critics perhaps reveals more about their 
fears and concerns about competition from China than it does about the shape of 
contemporary China-Africa relations. Our first question then is what theoretical 
tools are available in IR, political geography and development studies to begin 
the analysis of contemporary China-Africa relations?  Within this we argue for a 
broad political economy perspective, which is not deterministic but instead 
regards the unrolling of ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’ as a political 
process. As such we need to focus on the mechanisms, networks and discourses 
through which it is disseminated. For IR this means deconstructing numerous 
discourses, particularly Chinese geopolitical discourses, with a view to 
understanding how they have come to inform policy and practice. It also requires 
us to understand the mechanisms linking foreign policy discourses and events on 
the ground. For this we propose a state-centred political economy informed by 
post-colonial theory that (amongst other things) examines how ‘markets’ are 
engendered and legitimated through seemingly non-market processes.   
 
Our second focus is essentially empirical in terms of drawing upon these 
theoretical insights in order to analyse contemporary China-Africa relations. We 
ask how ‘new’ is China’s aid offensive in Africa and to what extent does China re-
work older discourses of geopolitics and development to legitimise its current 
engagement with Africa? Additionally we seek to assess how China’s vision of 
development ‘travels’ and how its local manifestations differ through interaction 
with African institutions. This approach recognises the differences between 
African polities, the agency of African political actors, the flexibility of the 
apparently rigid ‘Beijing Consensus’, and the extent to which China’s insistence 
on ‘non-interference’ really allows for locally relevant and ‘nationally-owned’ 
development policy. 
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IR, political geography and development: beyond reductionism 
 
We want to begin by addressing our first question that if China’s growth is 
changing its relationship with African states what theoretical tools are available to 
analyse contemporary China-Africa relations?25. In this sub-section we examine 
how IR and development studies have comprehended African politics and 
development, arguing that they have tended to treat knowledge as culturally 
siloed rather than hybrid, and mistreated the state to implicitly re-centre western 
political norms. As a result we challenge the idea that knowledge about 
international relations and countries is so culturally determined that only concepts 
derived from scholars embedded in the context in question can adequately 
interrogate that context. Instead we see knowledge as labile so that rather than 
reify and/or exoticise theories ‘with Chinese characteristics’ or ‘western 
rationality’ we need a more hybrid and emergent view of how theories of 
international relations evolve. This opens up a space to analyse Chinese IR 
theories, albeit tentatively, and the ways they shape international engagements 
in general and with Africa in particular. From there we move to understanding the 
mechanisms for analysing how these normative policy concerns coming from 
China are made real in Africa and how we can explain differences between 
African states. Here we take a broadly structural approach26 that relies on a 
Marxian political economy, which examines the interests of different fractions of 
international capital and their entwining with state interests. But rather than treat 
the unfolding of these interests under the current conjuncture of neoliberalism as 
somehow automatic we prefer the idea of neo-liberalisation as a political process 
that relies on a range of market and non-market discourses and practices to 
become embedded in particular contexts. In this way our framework ties together 
questions of structure, agency and discourse as part of a totality. 
 
IR, Africa and the virtue of hybrid theories 
The linkages between development discourses and theories of international 
relations are often implicit rather than explicit.  However, both share something of 
a Eurocentrism and reductionism, which places Africa as the subject of history 
and modernity27. In turn this forecloses a wide range of different African forms of 
political agency, agency which is actually completely necessary to any 
understanding of the dynamics of international relations. That said there have 
been a number of attempts in recent years at thinking past ‘Western’ IR which 
has increasingly been seen as “ethnocentric, masculinised, northern and top-
down”28 with many critics arguing that it has consistently ignored or 
misrepresented Africa in particular. International Relations remains configured, 
as it was in Hoffman‘s designation over thirty years ago, as “An American Social 
Science”29.There have been some parallel debates about ‘critical geopolitics’ and 
its neglect of the periphery of the world system (particularly Africa) in focusing on 
European or North American geopolitical discourses30.  Writing a few years after 
the establishment of the journal Political Geography, Peter Perry claimed that: 
“Anglo-American political geography poses and pursues a limited and 
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impoverished version of the discipline, largely ignoring the political concerns of 
four fifths of humankind”31. Eleanore Kofman reiterated this in the mid-1990s, 
noting “the heavily Anglocentric, let alone Eurocentric, bias of political geography 
writing”32. In this, political geography is not alone; the same critique has 
periodically been levelled at ‘Anglo-American’ human geography more widely33. 
In this Orientalist-inspired sense knowledge about the international functions to 
legitimise the structuring of international relations in which Africa is marginalised 
and managed. 
 
Dunn34 argues that western IR ignores Africa, because of its neorealist insistence 
on placing the state at the centre of explanations. Dunn goes on to argue that for 
Africa the state as conventionally understood is largely absent and so IR is 
incapable of comprehending the ‘real’ political dynamics of the continent.  This is 
in contrast, he argues, to the clearly delimited and coherent states of Europe 
which makes IR relevant to them. Dunn argues that Africa ‘does generate 
meaningful politics’35 and so we need ‘better’ IR, which problematises questions 
of sovereignty, power and the ‘nation’. While Brown is sympathetic to the broad 
project of a meaningful analysis of Africa in the world, he criticises Dunn and 
others for conflating IR with neorealism36. Brown’s argument is that neorealism 
suffers from serious limitations that are evident even before one transplants it to 
Africa. In particular the normalisation of the European state as the benchmark for 
analysis creates certain teleological arguments in which Africa, and some other 
regions, can only be found wanting37. The effect of arguing that Africa underlines 
the limits to theory and is so different that it requires an, as yet, unspecified ‘new’ 
theory only serves to marginalise Africa from core debates of IR. We 
wholeheartedly concur with Brown when he cites various examples of where IR 
has focused on global structures rather than states which has been fruitful for 
both IR and an analysis of Africa. Yet we cannot understand Africa in 
international relations without an analysis of the state which recognises its 
structural determinations as well as its local uniqueness, something we deal with 
below. 
 
So, critiques of certain IR theories mirror those of development for an implicit and 
Eurocentric statism thereby constructing knowledge in hegemonic ways. We 
would however argue that there are other ways of approaching the 
development/international politics nexus and that China-Africa relations offer the 
opportunity for de-centring the West from accounts of global politics and looking 
more closely at the ‘entwining’ of knowledges (as many post-colonial theorists 
have urged). In developing the critique of the likes of Dunn, Bilgin38 argues that 
these laudable attempts to insert the periphery into IR are based on a reversal of 
‘Western’ theorising.  Bilgin argues that such attempts should not limit their task 
to looking beyond the spatial confines of the ‘West’ in search for insight 
understood as ‘difference’, but also ask awkward questions about the 
‘Westernness’ of ostensibly ‘Western’ approaches to world politics and the ‘non-
Westernness’ of others39. The same may also be said about the ‘Westernness’ of 
ostensibly ‘Western’ approaches to development and the ‘non-Westernness’ of 
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others. For there may be elements of ‘non-Western’ experiences and ideas built 
in to ‘Western’ ways of thinking about and practising development and world 
politics. The reverse may also be true. What we think of as ‘non-Western’ 
approaches to world politics or ‘development’, in other words, may be suffused 
with ‘Western’ concepts and theories (e.g. the importance of modernisation 
discourses to China’s scientific or technocratic vision of ‘development’). Bilgin 
argues that this requires becoming curious about the effects of the historical 
relationship between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ in the emergence of ways of 
thinking and doing that are in Bhabha’s words ‘almost the same but not quite’40. 
Rather than becoming fixated with China’s or Africa’s exceptionalism it is 
possible that a process of ‘mimicry’ may emerge, in other words, as a way of 
‘doing’ world politics or development in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet unexpectedly 
‘different’ way. In this hybridity and mimicry we can accommodate the pressing 
ontological and epistemological point that neither ‘China’ nor ‘Africa’ is 
homogenous and that outcomes will inevitably be complex and differentiated as 
opposed to singular and similar as our earlier discussion of the Chinese ‘model’ 
of development suggests. 
 
Here then we have been trying to comprehend contemporary approaches to IR 
coming from China as a way of understanding how they influence and condition 
the country’s multiple modes of engagement with Africa. An important point about 
theory and policy in China is that “[t]he significance of a scientific theory lies in its 
ability to guide human behaviour”41 so that there has been, and still are, strong 
links between the outputs of Chinese foreign policy research centres and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)42. In reviewing the state of Chinese IR Zhang 
identified three contrasting schools. One argues that ‘Chinese scholars needed 
to "catch up" by "importing Western IR theories"43. By contrast there is another 
seeking to re-work Marxism-Leninism in order to develop an IR ‘with Chinese 
characteristics’, what Leonard44 refers to as the ‘neocomms’ (neo-communists).  
While potentially interesting this is still mired in what Zhang sees as an 
‘increasingly anachronistic’45 Maoist orthodoxy based on Lenin’s reading of 
imperialism tempered with world-systems theory, which he believes fails to 
produce any new insights. The third approach also seeks to capture the 
specificity of China’s development trajectory and argues that most IR theory has 
been developed in particular geopolitical contexts which serve to extend the 
hegemony of the dominant powers. While seeking to capture what is unique 
about China this third body of theory should “participate in theoretical debate in 
the global IR community while addressing theoretical issues in terms of China's 
national experience”46. Although not explicit and still in what Zhang terms a 
‘primary stage’ this mutual engagement may lead to a more ‘international’ IR 
theory. 
 
An example of the growing confidence of China’s IR theorising is the question of 
tianxia, based on a nationalistic use of history47. Drawing on two millennia of 
thinking, some public intellectuals see it as a normative ideal that could guide 
foreign policy. Meaning literally ‘all under heaven’ it has different inflections that 
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can mean ‘we, the Chinese’, all people, or a world institution. A key element is 
transformation, which is about transforming ‘enemies’ into ‘friends’, but can also 
be interpreted as a more thorough going cultural conversion to be more ‘like us’, 
namely enlightened Chinese, which smacks of earlier European colonial 
discourses. Although a piece of populist thinking, and in no way universally 
accepted, it shows a growing intellectual confidence among an increasingly 
nationalistic Chinese, keen to develop Chinese theory for a Chinese century. It is 
not our intention to analyse the logical consistency of tianxia, but to follow 
Callahan’s argument that “Each imperial system that he (Zhao Tingyang, the 
leading exponent of tianxia) criticizes….. has had its own utopian ideal to inspire 
its governance regime” (756). This then urges us to critically examine the 
changing range of theoretical models informing Chinese foreign policy; 
something we do in the next main section. 
 
China’s integration into the liberal world order we would argue has produced 
hybrid results that require us to think carefully about ‘non-Western’ 
similarity/difference. Further, much of the critical literature on development has 
focused on the US as holding a dominant and centralising position in the 
international development business and has explored the continuation of imperial 
power relations though the contemporary pursuit of ‘development’.  Yet as Hardt 
and Negri48 have argued, in today’s world “imperial geopolitics has no centre and 
no outside”, which opens up an analysis of China as a potential ‘imperialist’ 
power, although we would argue that such analysis must be rooted in actually 
existing effects and not read off a priori from a set of ideological and strategic 
prejudices. However, in valorising ‘non-western’ perspectives we are not 
advocating an uncritical relativism, which treats, for example, the proclamations 
of the Chinese government as any more legitimate than claims by rival 
governments vying for African resources. This necessarily has to be historicised 
in order to analyse continuities and identify traces of the past that influence (or 
are manipulated by) contemporary actors. This avoids de novo accounts that 
suggest what China is doing is, first, out of the blue in terms of Chinese foreign 
policy and, second, a significant departure from past practices of other external 
interests on the continent. 
 
Political economy and an emergent Chinese neo-liberalism in Africa 
While the first theoretical intervention is essentially deconstructive in making a 
case for examining the relationality and hybridity of international relations theory 
our second attempts to develop a framework for analysing how China-Africa 
interactions actually play out. This is vitally important since too many mainstream 
accounts of this interaction take a universalising stance arguing that ‘China’ acts 
uniformly across ‘Africa’ and that the impacts on economies, polities and 
environments are essentially the same49. Here we set out briefly our political 
economy framework for analysing China-Africa relations. 
 
We start from a structural analysis of the changing global economy and its 
implications for development. McMichael’s50 characterization of a move from 
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‘developmentalism’ to ‘globalism’ is instructive here, as is his observation that 
such moves have been a response to the crises of a previous regime. He argues 
that developmentalism, essentially a social-democratic welfarism, was a 
response to the crisis of 19th Century monetary control via the gold standard and 
the destablising effects of the World Wars. This Keynesian developmentalism 
came during the period of formal decolonization and underpinned state-led, 
protectionist and redistributive development policy. Globalism, by contrast, is the 
ideology of neo-liberalism and is a counter-mobilisation to the constraints of 
social protectionism, which seeks to engender market rule through institutional 
coercion which has weakened the power of some states. Neo-liberal capitalism is 
a project of reinstating or cementing class privileges which works through what 
some have termed ‘accumulation by dispossession’51. Far from being a 
temporary feature of capitalism, primitive accumulation is an incomplete and 
recurring phenomenon52, given new legitimacy under neo-liberalism in which 
displacement of people from their land and a violent proletarianisation are the 
norm for many in the developing world. 
 
The idea of China being ‘neoliberal’ is often queried given the traditional 
understanding of ‘neoliberalism’ as entailing strict market features unimpeded by 
state planning which is seen to be irreconcilable with the reality of the Chinese 
experience. To what extent however is a discussion of neo-liberalism useful in 
analysing China's development trajectory and intenationalisation strategy? 
Giovanni Arrighi53, for example, argues that China has refused to follow 
neoliberal prescriptions, implementing reforms gradually rather than by ‘shock 
therapy’ and emphasising a national interest in stability. Rather than doctrinaire 
neoliberalism Chinese policies emerge from a ‘pragmatic approach to problems 
of governance’54. Arrighi thus almost idealises the ‘Chinese model’ as 
ecologically aware, labour-friendly, egalitarian and decentred; a model of 
accumulation without dispossession. China’s hybridised “market society” is 
depicted here as offering a new development path that is attractive to other 
nations and as opening up the possibility of a ‘new Bandung’, one that “can do 
what the old one could not” and creating a “commonwealth of civilisations on an 
economic basis”55. Arrighi’s analysis implies that the Chinese development path 
provides a useful exemplar for the rest of the world and that the rise of China 
may therefore help to reduce global inequalities and to move toward a more 
sustainable and just form of political economy. Arrighi contends that 
contemporary China is pursuing a model of market society that is similar in many 
ways to the paternalistic commodifying “natural” path that Adam Smith saw in 
earlier centuries. Arrighi’s contention that China has not yet developed full-blown 
capitalism is largely based on Samir Amin’s observation that the rural peasantry 
has not yet been dispossessed of land and so full proletarianization has not 
emerged.  
 
It could even be argued that Chinese economic policies are arguably neo-
mercantilist in nature rather than being completely ‘neo-liberal’. They are of 
course fundamentally capitalist and as such, the post-Mao Chinese leadership is 
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doing precisely what the West wants it to do yet is, on occasion, castigated if and 
when processes unleashed by this liberalisation play themselves out on the 
global stage and in areas formerly held to be within the West's spheres of 
influence (e.g. ‘Africa’). David Harvey rightly emphasises that China is a ‘strange 
case’ as the outcome has been a particular kind of neoliberalism interdigitated 
with ‘authoritarian centralized control’56. Aihwa Ong57 detects however that 
“Harvey has trouble fitting China into his “neoliberal template” proposing instead 
to understand neoliberalism as a technology for governing 'free subjects’. 
Nonetheless, following Fulong Wu58 we would concur that “neoliberalization does 
capture some basic features of market re-orientation in China”. The Chinese 
state remains officially critical of neoliberal ideology, even as it encourages the 
forces of neoliberalism, whilst the state also counters neoliberalism with 
nationalism. Our characterisation of China’s economic vision as ‘neoliberal’ is 
necessarily tentative and provisional, however, and our research aims to 
understand further the applicability and appropriateness of this classification. In 
this process we can look to and seek to learn from the experiences of other ‘post-
socialist’ states undergoing transformation (particularly the USSR).  
 
For Harvey, the economic liberalisation in China started by Deng Xiaoping was 
initially intended as an attempt to empower China in relation to what was going 
on in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore as the Chinese sought to compete with 
those economies. Initially, Harvey argues, the Chinese did not want to develop 
an export-led economy, but what their reforms led to was the opening up of 
industrial capacity in many parts of China, resulting in China’s ability to market 
commodities on the world stage, due to good technology, a reasonably educated 
and certainly very cheap labour force.  The Chinese quickly found themselves 
moving into the global economy and in doing so they gained much more in terms 
of FDI, leading to greater interest in the neoliberalization process.  Whether it 
was by accident or design, is not clear, but it certainly has had far-reaching 
consequences. The post-1978 structural transformations under Deng followed a 
time when China had been economically devastated by the cultural revolution of 
1966-76 under Mao Zedong. Under Deng “the repudiation of the ‘cultural 
revolution’ was turned into an ideological and political instrument to justify and 
legitimate the following 30 years of neoliberal restructuring”59.Deng believed that 
neoliberalization was compatible with China’s political regime in which the state-
party forms the political arena for civil society and for Chinese economic actors. 
Indeed it was, as the market had become a potential solution and a means to ‘fix’ 
and resolve the impasse in the accumulation of capital under state socialism. 
Neoliberalization could be repackaged as ‘modernisation’ allowing the state to 
legitimise itself in the process and to increase its presence as a result. In this 
formulation, authoritarian control isn’t some strange oddity adding ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ to neoliberalism but is rather a reaction to the process of 
marketisation itself. The aim was to achieve economic liberalization that would 
contribute to the preservation of the power of the state, of the party and of the 
political regime of the state-party. Arguably this is also an objective that provides 
part of the common ground between China and some of its new African partners. 
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The form of primitive capitalism60 that has emerged in China is not the latest form 
of Deng’s ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ but it is one where state actors, 
often at the local level, remain central to the functioning of an economic system, 
the emergence of which: 
 
“[O]wes more to the agglomeration of numerous initiatives to interpret and 
implement economic change to serve particular interests than it does to the 
plans and strategies of national level decision making elites” 61 
 
The Chinese government’s narration of this historical transformation posits a 
continuous ‘transitional’ period that links past to present, socialism to capitalism. 
Wang Hui62 observes however that ‘transitional’ refers in part to a government-
inspired historical ‘myth’ that China’s transition from socialism is a natural and 
spontaneous historical development brought on through the introduction of 
market mechanisms. Wang argues that terms like ‘free trade’ and ‘unregulated’ 
are ideological constructs masking coercive government actions that favour 
particular groups and classes. This supposed ideological neutrality is also found 
in analyses of China’s Africa policy, which is often presented as commercial, 
pragmatic and rational63. The ‘transitional’ period in China may thus be more 
accurately described as a time of ‘violent state intervention.’ There can be no 
‘natural’ transition from economic to political reform, because the process is 
driven by certain power-dynamics and social forces foreshadowing a new era of 
state-capitalism and neo-liberal economics in which both the means of 
production and political power will be controlled by a few. Economic liberalisation 
and continuing political repression have gone hand-in-hand in China: market-
extremism, radical privatisation and economic corruption on the one hand, and 
strict control over politics and policy on the other. In these conditions, 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ has ensued through the privatization of state 
assets and the expropriation of the commons—both of which suited business and 
state elites in China. 
 
We therefore understand China’s growing internationalism as part of this process 
of neo-liberalisation. Rather than neo-liberalism being an essentially fully-formed 
programme that travels out from its centres in Washington and London as 
Harvey64 argues, it is more insightful to see neoliberalism as multiple and varied 
in the forms that it can take. Peck and Tickell65 make the case for a process–
based analysis of “neoliberalization”, arguing that the transformative and 
adaptive capacity of this far–reaching political–economic project has been 
repeatedly underestimated. Amongst other things, this calls for a close reading of 
the historical and geographical (re)constitution of the process of neoliberalization 
and of the variable ways in which different "local neoliberalisms" are embedded 
within wider networks and structures of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism operates at 
multiple scales and more attention needs to be paid to the different variants of 
neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes and 
to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques and 
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subjects66. We hope to analyse China as a contingent variant that is neither 
universal nor particular. There is a need to carefully specify the discourses, 
processes and mechanisms of neoliberalization, to understand its different 
institutional variants, and to examine how these are interconnected through new, 
translocal channels of policy formation67. Neoliberalism has both a creative (‘roll 
out’) and a destructive (‘roll back’) moment68 and any adequate treatment of the 
process of neoliberalization must explain how these moments are combined 
under different historical and geographical circumstances69.  
 
In countering the tendency to mis-represent the (African) state in IR and avoiding 
a determinism that simply treats (Chinese) neo-liberal involvement in Africa as 
some deus ex machina which robs African actors of any agency we focus on the 
state and its relations to capital. Here we are persuaded to a degree by 
Ferguson’s70 broad brush thesis that far from Africa being marginalised by 
globalisation it is selectively incorporated into it through enclaved investments of 
the type that major Chinese SOEs engage in. Like Harvey’s accumulation by 
dispossession this is based on exclusion and alienation of peasant producers. 
These tend to be in the minerals sector and draw inspiration from oil extraction 
with its gated compounds protected by private security forces and limited 
linkages with the local economy. In contrast to a colonial and post-colonial 
developmentalist model that promoted ‘thick’ sociality through company towns 
these contemporary projects create much thinner social investments. Ferguson 
goes on to argue that allied to this mode of insertion into Africa is a bifurcated 
governance model in which the increasingly unusable formal state structures are 
‘hollowed out’ fiscally and in terms of authority and personnel, while the usable 
enclaves are governed efficiently as private entities in a similar vein to pre-
colonial mercantilist exploitation. For the marginalised, according to Ferguson, all 
that remains is a transnational humanitarian form of governance orchestrated by 
international NGOs and implemented by the more able, former state employees 
now lured by higher salaries. 
 
Ferguson’s analysis chimes with much of what we see in China’s engagement 
with Africa, but we argue that the relationships between state and capital are 
more complex, especially given that Chinese capital is, at minimum, split 
between the large, state influenced TNCs and a myriad smaller, independent 
entrepreneurs. Whereas in the past Chinese firms and the state were 
coincidental, now there is some relative autonomy of Chinese firms from state 
agendas, although the ties between the CCP and the large Chinese 
multinationals remain quite strong.  However, smaller private Chinese firms, 
which have proliferated in Africa, are independent of Chinese state agendas to a 
degree even though they are encouraged71. The outcomes of China’s 
involvement in Africa will primarily be shaped by state-capital dynamics, 
particularly how Chinese capital and parts of the Chinese state intertwines with 
fractions of capital and political blocs within Africa. As Ferguson notes the 
internationalization of capital makes the relationships between capital and the 
state more complex, and breaks away from a rigid territorialisation of the political 
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and economic which assumes capital has a nationality72. We then have to 
examine different fractions of capital – some of which may be enclaved - and 
what role states play in enabling these to succeed or how capital itself exploits 
(unintended) differences in state policies. This is more complex than Ferguson’s 
bifurcated model of un/usable Africa and it is a profoundly political process as 
different classes seek to transform the state in pursuit of their interests. This is 
also important as Chinese policy responds to local political conditions while the 
Chinese doctrine of respecting sovereignty and non-interference is implicitly 
based on an assumption that a state exists in the first place. While we saw earlier 
that Dunn73 explains away IR per se, because of an assumed lack of adequate 
state-ness in Africa, we would argue that state forms exist but that they are 
different from the liberal ideal recognised by most political theory74. 
 
Histories of the present: China’s geopolitics and the invention of history 
  
In this section we want to examine China’s current engagement with African 
states and assess how foreign policy discourses ‘travel’ or circulate and are 
made real in concrete situations. If China’s vision of development co-operation 
requires a revitalized internationalism, which moves away from but builds upon 
past development trajectories, then we need to explore two key issues. First, it is 
necessary to examine the current situation through the lens of history in order to 
evaluate how ‘new’ this development approach really is and what mechanisms 
were put in place that condition the forms of engagement we see today.  
Secondly, we need to examine how this history functions as a discursive field 
through which current foreign policy is legitimized. 
 
China’s engagement with Africa has changed and expanded significantly in the 
last decade or so – and we will return to this in the next section - but it also builds 
on longer geopolitical traditions and histories of co-operation and interaction with 
the continent. While this history of China-Africa linkages is important for shaping 
contemporary development it is also used ideologically by China to legitimise its 
recent commercially centred activities. As recently as 2006 Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao said during a tour of Africa that for over 110 years “China was the 
victim of colonial aggression. The Chinese nation knows too well the suffering 
caused by colonial rule and the need to fight colonialism”75. It is this sense of 
historical mutuality around shared experiences of colonialism that is used to 
defend China’s current interventions in Africa against accusations of imperialism 
and to situate China discursively as part of both the ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ 
world. Beijing has also argued that both China and Africa are ‘cradles of 
civilisation’, that both face common challenges and even ‘enemies’ and that as a 
result they have common strategic interests and a shared perspective on major 
international issues. Further, the belief that the West’s historical experiences in 
achieving ‘development’ are distant from African experiences and offer few 
transferable lessons has been popular both in China and in many parts of Africa.  
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The particular shape of current China-Africa relations can be traced back to the 
connections forged during the anti-colonial struggles for independence during the 
revolutionary period of Chinese foreign policy from 1950 to the early 1970s. At 
this time China’s foreign policy was fiercely critical of the bi-polar Cold War world 
and was seeking to wrest the leadership of the non-aligned nations away from 
Moscow76. Harding77 identifies China’s foreign policy as both conflictual and 
cooperative, with the lines blurring between the two. Within the more co-
operative approaches that have tended to typify China’s African relationships 
Harding identifies benefactors, clients and partners. The benefactors have been 
the Cold War superpowers at different times. The clients of Chinese policy in 
Africa have been various liberation movements, which it used to foster an 
alliance across the continent preaching nationalism as the guiding principle78. 
There have been many partners in Chinese foreign policy, that have received 
less support in terms of concessional aid than these client states and who had an 
uneasy relationship with China during the Maoist period. According to Lyman79, 
the early days of PRC diplomacy primarily involved attempts to counter the 
international recognition of Taiwan and to compete with Western and Russian 
influence in the continent. China’s confrontation with the United States in the 
1950s and 1960s and with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s were 
particularly important. Two key historical moments stand out here - the Asian-
African Conference that met in Bandung80, Indonesia in April 1955 and the 
establishment of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) which 
held its first conference in 1957. More broadly, the roots of this engagement are 
to be found in the wider climate of ‘third worldism’ and in the movement towards 
non-alignment.  
 
Afro-Asian solidarity in particular, forged in the crucible of independence 
struggles, would go on to provide an important political foundation for the 
evolving China-Africa relationship. According to the post-conference analysis 
produced by the US administration’s Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) in 
195581, Bandung had been a psychological milestone, advancing the prospect of 
both ad-hoc and formal Afro-Asian partnership and signalling the end of a 
“lingering sense of inferiority” that might combine to create a stronger and 
friendlier region even one “more ready to cooperate with the West”. Given 
China’s colonial history and struggle against poverty, the Chinese claimed that 
their unique understanding of Africa’s economic dilemma lies at the root of Sino-
African solidarity and could serve as a strong foundation for cordial relations82. 
Bandung thus became “a symbol of Afro-Asia as a viable political concept”83 and 
China invoked the Bandung spirit to gain support for initiatives that China 
favoured. It does not appear that Africa was important to China at Bandung 
however and although it marked the beginning of significant Chinese initiatives in 
the continent there is little evidence that China foresaw this with clarity84. 
  
We can however trace the emergence of key guiding principles of China-Africa 
co-operation to the Bandung gathering. The “five principles” of pancheela 
(alternately panchsheel or panchshila), agreed upon by India’s Jawaharlal Nehru 
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and China’s Zhou Enlai at the conference were meant to serve as a model for 
intra-Asian relations. These were as follows: “respect for territorial integrity; 
nonaggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and 
mutual benefit in relations; and peaceful coexistence”85. In 1964, following a tour 
of ten African countries, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai confirmed Beijing’s support 
for African struggles against imperialism (which he called ‘the poor helping the 
poor’) setting the stage for Africa to become an ideological battleground with both 
Washington and Moscow86. When in Ghana and Mali Zhou Enlai announced 
eight guiding principles for Chinese aid to foreign countries that were a 
development of Pancheela including talk of equality, mutual benefit, non-
interference and respect for sovereignty. Aid would not be “a kind of unilateral 
alms but [rather] something mutual”87. The principles for aid and co-operation 
also reflected China’s own experience as an aid recipient itself over the 
preceding sixty years where the Chinese had not appreciated their ‘client’ 
status88 and were partly calculated to “show up the North”89. According to Snow90 
Chinese assistance to Africa at this time was considered to be a “heroic 
endeavour”, with the continent as the “object of a philanthropic crusade”91 and 
China seeking to discharge its “missionary duty of setting Africa free”92.  
 
However, Peking’s failures in Africa during the late 1960s may partly be 
attributed to the ignorance of PRC leaders and their failure to grasp the 
significance of regional antagonisms and cultural and historical differences 
between the various countries while trying to apply a general model of revolution 
to all African ‘liberation movements’93. During this time China tried to provide 
support to liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, for 
example, but “backed the wrong horse in all three cases”94. Similarly Snow95 
argues that the Chinese were not especially interested in domestic developments 
in African countries let alone in actively propagating Communism there. China’s 
relations with its ‘third world partners’ and ‘poor friends’ were “either thin or 
troubled through much of the Maoist period”96 as it refused to join key 
organisations like the G77 or the Non-Aligned Movement.  
 
China’s emphasis on South-South co-operation has long been seen as a key 
element in its efforts to oppose unilateral global dominance and an important 
way of building a relationship that will support Beijing’s diplomatic offensive 
against ‘hegemonism’. For Taylor97 the link connecting all Chinese foreign policy 
over the past 50 years is a desire to diminish and contain the influence of 
hegemonic powers and also to carve out a rightful place for China in the world, 
born from a sense that China has been ‘muscled out’ of international relations.   
Some authors98 are sceptical about China’s interest in Africa as a form of 
‘south-south cooperation’99 while development in China itself remains 
immensely uneven and the domestic basis for Chinese prosperity is in fact 
politically volatile100. So does China represent a new form of development 
‘partnership’ extending across the South? In what follows we argue that China 
has always engaged strategically with Africa and used the continent to bolster 
its national and geopolitical interests, which marks it out as similar to other 
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superpowers101. Therefore, perhaps this is not a new form of South-South 
development co-operation, but rather something quite similar to what other 
countries have done (and do) with respect to Africa. Ross102 sees a consistency 
in these interests; namely “to make China stronger, more modern and more self-
reliant”. This drive for modernity may have been unwavering, but the means for 
achieving it have changed drastically even if the older rhetoric of co-operative 
development is still being used to justify it. 
 
The geopolitics of China’s Africa policy 
 
While China’s engagement with Africa is premised upon this long-standing 
‘solidarity’ it is but one way in which its development strategy is exported and 
embedded. As we have argued there are multiple ways in which development is 
governed and the mediation of China’s strategy through individual African states 
is the key to the development outcomes of this engagement.  Hence, we want to 
shift focus to China’s recent involvement in Africa that emerged in the post-Cold 
War period and to examine Chinese discourses around aid and governance in 
particular. Then we examine how development is ‘delivered’ and how political 
discourses around respect of sovereignty are used to legitimise these 
interventions and briefly to flag how Chinese practices seem to be changing, 
largely as a result of its experiences in Sudan. We may be seeing a growing 
multilateralism by the Chinese and one where its non-interference dogma is 
breaking down. 
 
Liberal Internationalism and China’s foreign policy 
Over the past decade China’s stance on foreign relations has shifted. China’s 
transformation from a revolutionary power to a post-revolutionary state is 
reflected in the apparent shift in national priorities since the birth of the PRC in 
1949 between the two major periods of PRC history: the era of ‘revolution’ under 
Mao Zedong (1949-76) and the era of ‘modernisation’ under Deng Xiaoping 
(since 1978)103. According to Shimbun104 Chinese foreign policy discourses are 
shifting as multilateralism is prioritised over concerns with multipolarity, which 
underpinned much of the Mao era:  
 
“Multipolarity, anti-hegemonism and non-interference are the old concepts of a 
relatively weak and isolated China. The new concepts of a strong and globally 
engaged China--peaceful rise, win-win diplomacy, and harmonious world-- are 
more consistent with multilateralism, not multipolarity”105. 
 
Beijing’s advancement of the concept of multipolarity defined as the construction 
of more or less flexible alliances to contain every form of hegemony and to build 
a new and just international order, has often motivated increasing China’s 
engagement in Africa106. In the second phase Leonard107 sees a broad left-right 
schism within the PRC, with old guard communists being much more belligerent 
towards other international powers and seeing the need to enhance domestic 
military capability. The ‘new right’ are a small but influential group (although their 
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influence has waned since the mid-1990s) who want complete liberalisation and 
a market oriented foreign policy. The current leadership are variously described 
as ‘populist’108 and ‘new left’109, because they espouse a belief in markets but 
tempered by the need to reduce inequality. Within them is a liberal 
internationalist group that want engagement with the norms of the international 
community based on the idea of ‘peaceful ascendance’. 
 
Since late 2003, top-level Chinese officials have used the term 'peaceful 
ascendance' to describe an ideal growth plan for Chinese economic, political, 
and military expansion but the implications of this policy remain ambiguous. The 
populist concept of ‘scientific development’ currently guides the socio-economic 
ideology of the CCP, seen as the latest version of ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ and an extension of the ideas of Mao and Deng, one that was 
ratified into the party’s constitution at the 17th party congress in October 2007. It 
is dominated by egalitarian concepts such as the creation of a ‘harmonious’ and 
‘person-based’ society, sustainable development, increased democracy and 
social welfare. Very much associated with Hu Jintao, it seeks to shift the focus of 
the official government agenda from ‘economic growth’ to ‘social harmony’. What 
does ‘pursuing development in a scientific way’ mean? Could it be modernisation 
discourse dressed up as something different, something Chinese (with its belief 
in the ‘law of development’ and its focus on questions of efficiency, science, 
industrialisation, education and the technical)?  
 
China’s Africa policy 
These general principles are reiterated in the more focused polices towards 
Africa a key driver of which has been demand for energy supplies and natural 
resources. By the mid-1990s this had become the mainstay of China’s foreign 
policy. China began importing oil in 1993 and what has followed is a deepening 
reliance and dependency on imported oil and gas so that China has increasingly 
been looking at ways of obtaining supplies and securing transport routes. This 
need to increase and diversify sources of oil is clearly not unique to China110 and 
has seen a renewed interest in Africa as a source of oil and other strategic 
minerals such as copper and cobalt111.  
 
The China-Africa summit of November 2006 was by far the biggest diplomatic 
event that China had ever hosted. In addition to a package of debt cancellation 
and technical cooperation they launched a US$5 billion China-Africa 
Development Fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa, and the 
Chinese also published the equivalent of a white paper entitled China’s Africa 
Strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2006112).  The policy is premised 
on respect for sovereignty and ‘non-interference’ in national political processes, 
which marks it out as different from western approaches that inevitably come with 
conditions. Indeed, non-interference has been claimed to be a long-standing 
principle of China’s engagement with Africa (ever since the principles of co-
operation laid out by Zhou Enlai in the 1960s) but has this ever been more than 
just rhetoric used to conceal/camouflage deeper interests? Western donors 
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increasingly promote development ‘partnerships’ and the local ‘ownership’ of 
development agendas, articulating an equalising rhetoric that attempts to 
disavow and displace European paternalism113 and remove the emphasis on 
external accountability for policy and its outcomes. It is not yet clear whether 
Chinese discourses around south-south co-operation and partnership are 
different to this but there is clearly a much longer history of thinking about co-
operation across the South within China (although Socialism also had its own 
forms of trusteeship).  
 
Clearly China’s growing economic strength means that it is unlikely to have a 
partnership of equals with its new African friends but we need to know much 
more about how China understands ‘co-operation’ and more about the oft-
invoked ‘win-win’ claims made for this. That said, China’s involvement in Africa 
does permit the ‘revival of triangulation’114, which means African states can 
pursue relations with more than one external state (epitomised by Angola’s turn 
to China as its negotiations with the IMF faltered in 2003) and play donors and 
investors off against one another. Lower than expected oil revenues in 2009 
however have changed this situation in Angola as government officials began 
meeting with World Bank and IMF representatives in September to agree a 
support package115. Half-year trade statistics show that year-on-year from June, 
China-Angola trade fell 57% to US$5.8 billion one of the biggest drops in bilateral 
trade116.  
 
Angola’s experience is emblematic of the changes consequent upon the global 
financial crisis. China’s economy has been hit hard with redundancies in the 
export sector, reversals of rural-urban migration, and, crucially, reduced prices 
and demand for primary commodities of the type that Africa specialises in117. 
However, in addition to a domestic stimulus package which should help restore 
demand, China has promised to honour its pledges to projects in Africa118 and 
recent announcements in the West African oil sector119 suggests that the 
Chinese are still willing and able to invest heavily in African resource extraction. 
Moreover the China-Africa Development Fund, the central plank of the Africa 
Policy, has funded its first phase of projects including a power plant in Ghana 
and a glass factory in Ethiopia, and recently opened its first representative office 
in Johannesburg120. Late 2009 is also when the 4th FOCAC inter-ministerial 
meeting will take place in Egypt and although details are sketchy at the time of 
writing121, 2009 is the year when the Africa Policy promised tangible results so 
we would expect the meeting to be a review of progress towards the pledges of 
2006. However, transparency with targets is often lacking (see below) in Chinese 
policy and (like their western counterparts) pledges remain just that122.  
 
The softening of non-interference 
Chinese discourses of partnership also relate to its role in multilateral 
organizations, to its contestation of hegemony and to its desire to become a 
major centre of influence in a multipolar world123. Along with an additional tool of 
Chinese foreign policy, the provision of preferential trade access to African 
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‘partners’, these discourses and initiatives construct China as a viable alternative 
to the West whilst simultaneously signalling China’s role as a generous global 
power124. As part of its liberal internationalism and its recent ascension to the 
WTO, China recognises it needs to court votes to protect and promote its 
interests125. Respect for sovereignty and non-interference represent two key 
phrases that have been repeated in China’s rhetoric surrounding its aid 
disbursements to Africa. This rhetoric encourages the impression that China is 
not imposing its political views, ideals or principles onto recipient countries126. 
According to Liu Guijin (the Chinese government’s special representative to 
Africa in 2006):  
 
“China has no intention to undermine Africa's democracy. China is working 
hard to build a socialist democracy and promote human rights and good 
governance at home…China is a responsible major country in the world. I 
doubt there is any tiny political gain China can get by doing such things against 
the historical trend and the common wish of the people”127. 
 
Speaking in Khartoum in February 2008, Liu Guijin went on to say: 
 
“We [China] have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of political 
conditions to these aid and development projects, because we think that 
providing assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it is not for political 
purposes, not for showing off to the outside world”128.  
 
This forms the core of its non-interference policy and the perception that China is 
now ‘non-ideological’ and pragmatic, since its concerns are for securing 
resources rather than transforming hearts and minds.  At the same time there is 
a discourse of mutual interdependence, which fits with China’s foreign policy 
doctrine of peaceful ascendance. At the core is an acknowledgement that 
“[a]lthough Africa might need China, China definitely needs Africa more for her 
development process”129. This reveals the essentially commercial and 
transparent nature of China’s engagement with Africa. It is less about a managed 
process of ‘catching up’ with more developed nations, but an even-handed 
recognition that Africa’s resources are vital for China’s growth and that this is a 
‘win-win’ situation for both parties.  This commercialism over aid strategy infuses 
much policy, but it remains to be seen if the dividends from this growth reach the 
poorer sections of African societies130. 
 
We would argue that non-interference has always been a flexible practice, 
depending on the circumstances, and also that such a principle necessarily 
cannot be permanent. Where deals are signed with unpopular dictatorial regimes 
that could later be revised by a new government, it becomes necessary for the 
Chinese to protect such regimes. Karumbidza131 is probably correct then when 
he says that “the Chinese are themselves well aware” that their non-interference 
stance is untenable in Africa. Given that the economic relationship matters to 
China, its government has a vested interest in long-term stability, and its current 
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rhetoric suggests an understanding that this is best procured by “harmony” and 
the careful balancing of interests, not by force. Non-interference is a principle that 
is certainly breaking down as shown by China’s recent involvement in Sudan and 
by the emerging strategy of ‘proactive non-interference’ that has been used in 
negotiations for a post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. The fact that China is doing 
so goes against some of the ‘rogue aid’ discourses since China is now acting 
more ‘responsibly’ in seeking to resolve internal governance issues.  
 
Sudan is a case in point for how China’s stance has changed132.  China’s stance 
on human rights was framed in its anti-imperialist rhetoric, which has two 
elements.  One is historical, which argues that Western powers are hypocritical 
given the colonial abuses.  As Li Anshan argues:  
 
“This is indeed ironic, coming from western countries talking about abuse of 
human rights, when they have committed relentless human right abuses during 
their colonial periods…. It is almost shameful for these countries to accuse 
China of human rights abuses, when they have committed much more 
atrocious acts in the past”133.   
 
The second rebuttal is related in that any conditionality around human rights is 
seen by the Chinese as necessarily an abuse of human rights. It is this defence 
of sovereignty that has characterised China’s Sudanese engagement. Over the 
past 10 years China’s ‘blind-eye’ support for various Khartoum governments in 
return for uninterrupted running of the oil industry by CNPC134 has had massive 
political impacts. Sudan’s oil rich regions generate considerable revenue, but 
there have been negligible improvements in service delivery for affected civilian 
populations. Moreover China has supplied arms to Sudan and helped develop 
northern Sudan’s arms manufacturing industry. China’s diplomacy on Darfur 
became more public from 2006 to the point where it cannot be said to be not 
‘interfering’. Beijing has however underestimated the political risk posed by 
Darfur to its interests in Sudan, as well as its standing in Africa and on the 
international stage. The appointment of a new special ambassador in May 2007 
was part of China’s efforts to bolster its image and contribute to solutions. For 
example, more aid has been given to Darfur.  Such moves also enabled China to 
promote its own interests through more vocal diplomacy and participation in 
multilateral forums and initiatives on Darfur. Yet China’s more proactive 
diplomacy was accompanied by continuity in defending the sovereignty of Sudan 
and arguing against further sanctions, as well as deepening economic links.  
Thus for this ‘pariah state’135 the impact of oil has been to further concentrate 
wealth rather than achieve broader development, and this seems likely to worsen 
even if, as a result of diplomacy, it may lose some of its ‘pariah’ status.  The 
Sudan case is pivotal for not only showing how China is changing, but also for 
the ways that western donors are seeking to co-operate with China in finding 
solutions to African development.   
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Hence, there are questions about the delivery of Chinese ‘aid’ and possibilities of 
development cooperation between donors. The view that China is not imposing 
its political views, ideals or principles onto recipient countries is further cemented 
by the complexity of disassociating Chinese aid and investment and the lack of 
transparency in China’s overseas aid allocation and disbursement. There is 
clearly no official definition of ‘aid’ in China and some considerable ambiguity 
about what constitutes ‘aid’ (MOFCOM is currently trying to define this)136. The 
realities which are selected for critique are the lack of transparency on how 
Chinese aid is allocated, its amount and level, and effectiveness.  Compounding 
the perception of China as a ‘rogue creditor’ is the lack of details about the level 
and terms of its own aid to other countries—so data and information in that 
regard are sketchy137. The volume of Chinese aid is often regarded as a state 
secret138 and data on this is not collected in the same way as it is by western aid 
donors. According to Lancaster139, the Chinese justify this secrecy to avoid 
criticism and competition from major donor countries, and domestic criticism of 
providing aid to foreign countries instead of eradicating poverty domestically. 
China is not a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which reports on 
members' international aid140. Not enough is yet known for example, about the 
new round of major Chinese-led infrastructure projects in Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Gabon141. It seems entirely possible that 
while it may seem appropriate for Westerners to pick out the education and 
health sectors as obvious categories to be treated as ‘aid’, China’s own 
preference has been to think of its relations with individual countries in a much 
more holistic way142. Chinese practice is unfamiliar (or at least uncomfortable) 
with the notion of ‘development’ policy as an independent policy field of the kind 
that emerged among the Western nations in the course of the 1950s. China has 
thus generally not been offering integrated development projects for Africa similar 
to the World Bank and IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs). 
Instead, it frequently offers a series of infrastructural and one-off development 
projects formulated bilaterally. Moreover, meta-narratives about aid, or 
references to the establishment of Xiaokang societies elsewhere in the world, do 
not appear to exist143. 
 
Aid is also often tied up with other forms of assistance and economic co-
operation and neither is it given by a single Ministry (the Ministry of Commerce 
provides most bilateral aid through its Department of Foreign Aid but it also 
comes from the Ministries of Health and Education whilst the Ministry of Finance 
provides multilateral aid). Additionally, aid and development assistance do not 
just come from central government sources but also from provincial governments 
and urban administrations (e.g. through twinning arrangements).  
 
In concrete terms the blurring of aid, investment and development is realised 
through the mechanisms for funding projects.  Sautman and Hairong144 contend 
that in contrast to western aid, which increasingly goes directly to national 
budgets as ‘sectoral support’, Chinese aid is usually assigned to designated 
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projects (usually infrastructure related) and is therefore harder to siphon off.  The 
Chinese also usually part pay for their oil and other resources in infrastructure 
which means there is less free-floating cash for unscrupulous diversion. There is 
limited evidence however that the move to direct budget support and Sector-
Wide Approaches by western donors is any better than the bilateral, project 
based approach of the Chinese. One argument for project-led development 
approaches is that they are bounded and one can more easily see if they are not 
completed, whereas the other approaches potentially put money into a rather 
opaque pot where it can be siphoned off at every stage of implementation. 
Budget and sectoral support may increase ‘ownership’ by recipient governments 
but it might also be seen as introducing western donors more deeply into the 
heart of government145. There has thus been a blurring of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ in 
this era of ‘post-conditionality’146 as the institutions and mechanisms of 
governance become increasingly inseparable from the international mechanisms 
of governance with which they are engaged. In some ways it could be argued 
that China (with its emphasis on non-interference) has not sought to blur inside 
and outside in quite the same way as western donors and by its insistence on 
bilateral relations has actually done something rather different.   
 
The routes for aid and investment are the privileged Chinese corporations 
selected as part of the Chinese Government’s ‘Go Out’ Policy of 2002147.  These 
‘national champions’ form the brunt of China’s internationalisation strategy, but 
as more companies internationalise it becomes harder for the Chinese state to 
maintain a coherent strategic and regulatory hold over them. As China further 
liberalizes, private Chinese businesses become less and less easy to control in 
China itself, let alone in Africa. This is a major conundrum for the Chinese 
government wishing, as it does, to safeguard Beijing's image abroad as a 
‘responsible power’ and it is not restricted to Sino-African relations. China’s 
corporate engagement with Africa has thus been exaggerated whilst the ‘China 
Inc. model’ is far less efficient and monolithic than is often assumed148. There is 
also the increasing presence of smaller, provincially backed companies operating 
overseas. Schuller & Turner149 argue that Chinese companies are seen by the 
State as part of its “geopolitical positioning” in Africa since SOE’s contribute to an 
overall programme of foreign economic policy yet many of the companies 
concerned do not see their role in Africa as part of some wider geopolitical 
practice and there are multiple points of disjuncture between the activities of 
some SOEs and this wider foreign policy. Thus as China’s Africa strategy comes 
to rely on a growing number of bureaucratic principles and corporate agents, 
contradictions will increase.  Beijing is relying on an increasingly complex set of 
government oversight agencies to accomplish its Africa policy but this is ever 
harder to manage (including the State Council, Chinese embassies, FOCAC, the 
Ministries of finance, commerce, foreign affairs, chambers of commerce, state 
owned companies and a variety of commercial and ‘development’ banks). 
McGregor150 reports, for example, that a range of diplomatic scholars in Beijing 
have recently noted how the SOE’s have often ‘hijacked’ China’s diplomatic 
initiatives in Africa (especially in Sudan), pursuing profit at the expense of 
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broader national interests. These oversight agencies do not enjoy direct lines of 
authority over Chinese corporations overseas: 
 
“As it deepens, the Chinese government will more likely find itself hamstrung 
by…an increasing set of tensions and contradictions between the interests and 
aims of government principals—the bureaucracies based in Beijing tasked with 
advancing China’s overall national interests—and the aims and interests of 
ostensible agents—the companies and businesspersons operating on the 
ground in Africa”151. 
 
Moreover there is a related issue of future indebtedness since debt write-offs and 
access to export credit loans increases African countries’ creditworthiness and 
may allow private debt to be built up by African states. In both cases Chinese 
involvement could further ‘hem in’ African countries in a way that they were 
hemmed in by western creditors in the 1970s-1990s. China has clearly upset the 
dominant aid regime but donors cannot be too critical for fear of upsetting China 
so they instead call for and promote ‘dialogue’ and partnership. The UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) are very active in this and 
rather than pledge much aid to Chinese development they are more concerned 
with Millennium Development Goal 8 – building a global partnership for 
development. Here the assumption is that China can be ‘socialised’ into the 
norms of the international aid business/community. Such critics contend that 
China’s engagement with Africa should still be guided by Western values and 
should conform to established patterns of Western involvement on the 
continent152, but rather than outright criticism they prefer a ‘dialogic’ approach153. 
China, for example, is a signatory of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (evidently from a recipient perspective), which seeks increased 
harmonisation and alignment between donors and between donors and 
recipients. Despite this commitment however China’s Africa Policy remains 
focused on bilateral aid.  A not dissimilar issue around the politics of aid concerns 
China’s relations with the African Union and NEPAD154, both of which China 
actively supports and are ‘test-beds’ for its changing stance on multilateral 
politics. Whatever the efficacy of NEPAD, it posits a multilateralist approach to 
solving Africa’s development problems. While the Chinese state-backed 
investors are relatively lax about transparency, accountability and sustainability 
of investments, NEPAD has been developing the African Peer Review 
Mechanism in an effort to encourage African countries to set standards and put 
in place procedures for vetting and monitoring investments.  Again, there are 
potential tensions and it seems likely that in the rush to attract and maintain 
Chinese investments, African countries may be tempted into a race for the 
bottom in terms of labour and environmental standards.   
 
Conclusion: ‘critical geopolitics’, geoeconomics and China-Africa relations 
 
The rapid economic growth registered by ‘rising powers’ like China, Brazil and 
India in recent years and the growing evidence of cooperation around a broad 
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spectrum of issues among states of the global South have revived the hope (or 
spectre) of a new ‘Bandung’—just over a half-century after leaders of 29 African 
and Asian states met in that Indonesian hill resort town to ‘inject the voice of 
reason in world affairs,’ as President Sukarno put it. For commentators like 
Arrighi, China holds up the possibility of a ‘new Bandung’ and a ‘commonwealth 
of civilisations on an economic basis’. The notion that China may be an exemplar 
of contemporary egalitarianism in relations with the periphery would seem to be 
contradicted however by the evidence currently emerging from Africa. Further, 
there is evidence of rising social unrest in China, despite this being held up as a 
model of accumulation without dispossession. The more convincing power of 
Arrighi's argument lies however in his conception of geopolitics as the endless 
process by which political cultures and institutional complexes are constructed 
and in the way he clearly links international events (like the rise of China) to their 
economic context in a world system characterised by global flows and relations. 
In a similar vein Smith and Cowen155 have argued that there has been a recent 
recasting of traditional geopolitical logics and practices in the context of (amongst 
other things) globalisation and that these may better be captured today by a 
“geoeconomic” conception of space, power and security, which sees geopolitical 
forms ‘recalibrated by market logics’. Thus it could be argued that geoeconomics 
is crucial to any interpretation of contemporary China-Africa engagement and to 
our understanding of the spatial reconfiguration of contemporary political 
geographies that results from this engagement.  
 
From the case of China in Africa we call for an intensification of the dialogue 
between critical geopolitics and critical development theory. Geopolitics and 
development theory are conventionally kept apart by a well established social 
scientific division of labour which assumes that the domain of the (geo)political is 
discrete and separable from the supposedly economic and technical domain of 
development156. Picking up on our earlier discussion of development and IR it is 
impossible to understand the contemporary making of development theory and 
practice without reference to geopolitics and the geopolitical imagination of non-
western societies. As Slater argues: “power and knowledge … cannot be 
adequately grasped if abstracted from the gravity of imperial encounters and the 
geopolitical history of West/non-West relations’157.This is not to say that 
development is little more than the continuation of politics by another means 
since we cannot dismiss aid as simply part of some past and therefore “outdated 
sideshow in the repertoire of geopolitics”158. Yet all conceptualisations of 
development contain and express a geopolitical imagination which condition and 
enframe its meanings and relations159. China’s contemporary vision of 
development does not envisage a domain completely separate from foreign 
policy concerns and actively mobilises historical discourses of geopolitics 
(respect for sovereignty, non-interference in political affairs, anti-hegemonism) 
and the language of commonality and mutuality (solidarity, friendship, anti-
imperialism) in order to justify and legitimate its contemporary Africa policy.  
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Rather than separating out the (geo)political from the economic and technical 
aspects of development theories and practices we have critically explored the 
geopolitics of China’s relations with African development in a more open and 
inclusive way rather than to speak only of ‘aid’ or ‘development assistance’ in 
isolation. This required unravelling the complexity of China’s aid disbursement 
and disentangling the blurring of aid, trade and overseas investment (which 
themselves have complex routes to Africa). Davies et al160 make a distinction 
between ‘aid’ and development assistance, but it is not always as easy as they 
suggest to differentiate between the two161. ‘Aid’ was historically used as an 
important geopolitical tool for the Chinese in the contest with Taiwan (also an aid 
giver) and the USSR (where the Chinese aimed to shame the Kremlin by 
stepping up their charity and economic aid and by providing fewer arms). ‘Aid’ 
thus became an important way of exposing the limitations of China’s opponents, 
both Western and Soviet. A critical geopolitics must therefore examine how 
China’s historical imagination of geopolitics has enframed the meanings attached 
to ‘development’ and the relations forged with African ‘partners’ as a result. This 
historical imagination of geopolitics remains crucial since it forms a discursive 
field through which current foreign policy is legitimised. Further engagement with 
Chinese (and African) approaches to IR is an important first step in this regard.  
 
Whilst Chinese ‘aid’ is used to further geopolitical claims it has been different 
from western approaches. A continuing point of distinction is the bilateral 
disbursement of aid, the absence of grand, moralising meta-narratives and the 
emphasis on south-south ‘co-operation’. China’s strategy is “one of humanitarian 
and development aid plus influence without interference, in contrast to the West’s 
coercive approach of sanctions plus military intervention”162. A critical geopolitics 
of China-Africa relations must acknowledge the Orientalisms at work in western 
characterisations of China as an exception and acknowledge that there may be 
aspects of China’s vision of development that are ‘almost the same’ as those of 
western donors ‘but not quite’. One point of similarity is China’s desire to align 
with aspects of the Western economic-growth paradigm based on science and 
knowledge.  
 
China has seemed hesitant however about challenging the contemporary world 
order (or the widening income and wealth inequalities within its borders) and thus 
to a certain extent a process of ‘mimicry’ is at work in China’s (‘neoliberalized’) 
vision of successful economic development which may be producing seemingly 
‘similar’ yet unexpectedly ‘different’ outcomes. Further, China is not the only 
show in town and Chinese engagement with Africa needs to be understood in the 
context of the wider contemporary ‘scramble for Africa’ of which it is a part. This 
includes the efforts of the EU, of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the India-
Africa Forum, the Turkey-Africa Summit and the Tokyo International Conference 
on African Development (TICAD)163. Allied to this is the need to disaggregate 
‘China’ and ‘Africa’ since neither represents a coherent and uniform set of 
motivations and opportunities. The supposed ‘Beijing consensus’ that many 
commentators have often (prematurely) proclaimed has proven to be remarkably 
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flexible and malleable in the way it has been adapted to different political 
contexts in Africa. In order to understand why it is necessary to foreground 
questions of political economy and in particular state-capital dynamics in 
exploring how Chinese capital and parts of the Chinese state intertwine with 
fractions of capital and political formations within Africa. We also need to know 
much more about the range of impacts China is having on forms of African 
governance, the role China takes in situations of conflict and about the relations 
China has with local, regional and global institutions. A critical geopolitics must 
also engage with the media discourses on China’s engagement with Africa which 
draw on a range of Orientalist assumptions that essentialise China and over-
simplify its motivations whilst remaining deeply uncritical of western interactions 
with the continent. This requires a ‘post-colonial’ analysis of the constructed 
imaginaries of ‘China’ and ‘Africa’, and the geopolitical images and 
representations of Chinese and African ideologies, foreign policies and cultures 
that circulate and sediment in popular culture. Allied to this is a concern for the 
dynamics of ‘class’ and ‘race’ in particular African countries.  
 
Finally, a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development 
involves a nuanced understanding of China’s search for new sources of energy 
and raw materials. Whilst China’s presence in Africa is frequently described as a 
imperialist ‘scramble’, a ‘mad dash’, a resource ‘grab’ even a ‘rape’164  the image 
of a defenceless African populace passively submitting to the will of external 
powers is depressingly all too familiar. How is China’s ‘soft power’ and oil 
diplomacy mediated by African agency and more generally what are the specific 
discourses, processes and mechanisms that are involved in the rolling out and 
reception of ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’? Ultimately, it is up to 
African leaders to manage their relations with China for the benefit of their own 
economies and citizens. It is not China's responsibility to ‘look out’ for 
African self-interest. China’s abandonment of ideology in favour of a focus on 
economic growth arguably affords Africa a greater degree of space in its 
connection with China but only if this manoeuvrability is used wisely by Africa's 
elites. In some countries this should not be a problem as adept and proficient 
governments are more than able to manage the relationship to mutual benefit. In 
others however there is a concern that predatory elites at the apex of 
neopatrimonial regimes and not especially bothered by the impulse to promote 
development will make a mess of the chance to make the most of a renewed 
Chinese interest in Africa.  
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